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Evaluating Trade Adjustment Assistance
and Wage Insurance
Roger White
Franklin and Marshall College

The author examines the effectiveness of stylized versions of the Trade Adjustment
Assistance (TAA) and Alternative TAA (or wage insurance) programs in reducing
displacement-related earnings losses. Wage insurance subsidies and returns to TAAfunded training are applied to estimates of proportional earnings losses, reported by White,
that were generated using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 data spanning
the period from 1979 to 2000. Wage insurance reduces the typical worker’s losses by
14.4 percent, while TAA-funded training is estimated to reduce losses by 23.7 percent.
However, variation in the time paths and magnitudes of losses produces considerable
variation in the effects of these programs across worker types.
Keywords: displacement; earnings losses; Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA);
Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA); wage insurance

1. Introduction
The introduction of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program (TAA) as part of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 led many labor constituents to support a more liberal U.S. trade policy. Effectively, the promise of assisting trade-displaced workers
as they transitioned to new, potentially more productive positions was deemed an
acceptable trade-off to facing greater competition from foreign producers. The U.S.
Tariff Commission’s subsequent rejection of all applications for TAA benefits
through 1969, however, set in motion the erosion of labor’s support for trade liberalization. In recent decades, support for liberal trade policies among organized labor
has further diminished, and opposition has emerged as domestic firms and workers
have suffered both increased exposure to import competition and public policy
responses that have been viewed as ineffective.
In 2002, the Trade Promotion Authority Act reauthorized TAA, merged TAA with
the North American Free Trade Agreement–Transitional Adjustment Assistance
program to establish the Consolidated TAA program, and created a demonstration
program, Alternative TAA (ATAA), commonly referred to as “wage insurance.” Since
the intent of these programs is to aid displaced workers and thus to reduce opposition
1
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to trade liberalization, the fact that a sizable portion of the population consistently
expresses antitrade sentiment suggests a failure of public policy. I evaluate the
performance of stylized versions of the TAA and ATAA programs in terms of their
effectiveness in reducing displacement-related earnings losses. This is important, as
several studies have documented long-run monetary losses that are attributable to job
displacement, but how well these programs have fared, in terms of reducing such
losses, has yet to be examined. That effective public policy is in the best interests
of both labor and policy makers further underscores the importance of gauging the
performance of existing policies.
I begin with estimates of proportional displacement-related earnings loss reported
by White (forthcoming) and calculate, for a variety of worker types, corresponding
reductions in workers’ losses expected to result from TAA-funded training or the
receipt of wage insurance benefits. The result is a series of estimates that indicate the
degree to which each program reduces earnings losses. A number of studies have
examined the relationship between job displacement and earnings losses; specifically,
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) used administrative data from Pennsylvania,
Ruhm (1987) and Stevens (1997) used Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
data, and White (forthcoming) and Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) used National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) data. Although each study examined
a different data source and/or time period, these studies produced a set of general
results (discussed below) and corresponding estimates of earnings losses (which
I present in section 3). White adopted the methodology used by Jacobson, LaLonde,
and Sullivan; Stevens; and Kletzer and Fairlie; however, a lengthier and more recent
time period was examined. Also, the NLSY79 data more accurately identify worker
displacement than the PSID data, and relative to the data used by Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan, the NLSY79 data permit the construction of a larger set of
control variables. Thus, the earnings losses reported by White are arguably more
precise. Additionally, unlike other studies, White provided loss estimates for union
and nonunion workers, female and male workers, and various age classifications and
levels of educational attainment.
Displaced workers have been found to face two types of earnings losses. First,
prior to displacement, losses may occur because of an erosion of the real wage or
through reductions in hours worked. Such losses are referred to as “predisplacement”
losses. Immediately following displacement, workers do not receive wage income
but may collect unemployment insurance (UI). Once reemployed, significant time
at the new job may pass before a worker’s wages reach the level expected had the
displacement not occurred. Earnings lost while unemployed less the sum of any UI
compensation received and reduced earnings once reemployed constitute “postdisplacement” losses. It is important to note, however, that displacement-related losses
are not restricted to workers’ earnings. Job displacement may also result in the loss
of employer-based health insurance, pension and other retirement benefits, and other
nonpecuniary costs.
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The TAA program provides trade-displaced workers with retraining, job search
assistance, a health care tax credit, and an additional period of unemployment compensation, if necessary, beyond that received by other unemployed workers. I consider
how well the training component of TAA fares in reducing displacement-related
earnings losses, since training is thought to confer the majority of long-run benefits
for participating displaced workers. The ATAA program (i.e., wage insurance) provides workers with a subsidy equal to half the difference between pre- and postdisplacement weekly earnings. The maximum payout to each worker is $10,000, and
benefits are available for up to two years from the date of displacement. Eligibility
for both TAA and ATAA benefits is subject to the fulfillment of conditions that at
times can be considered onerous. Section 2 provides a more detailed overview of the
two programs and the eligibility constraints. In this analysis, I relax these constraints
to facilitate the evaluation of each program’s effectiveness and to generate a broad
set of estimates, across worker types, regarding reductions in earnings losses.
I find that the receipt of ATAA-provided wage insurance benefits or the successful
completion of TAA-funded training fails to eliminate even a majority of the typical
worker’s displacement-related earnings losses. On the basis of the observed time path
of losses and the structure of the wage insurance program, the receipt of ATAA benefits would reduce the typical worker’s total displacement-related earnings losses by
only 14.4 percent. The completion of TAA-funded training, by comparison, is estimated
to reduce losses by 23.7 percent. Since the NLSY79 data provide no information on
worker participation in training programs, I cannot directly examine the effectiveness
of training undertaken by workers in the NLSY79 cohort. To circumvent this shortcoming of the NLSY79 data, I use estimates of returns to training (3 percent, 6 percent,
and 10 percent) that are provided in the literature, while assuming no depreciation of
acquired skills over the period during which displacement-related earnings losses
occur. The estimated 23.7 percent reduction in losses is based on a worker realizing a
6 percent training return. To eliminate all displacement-related earnings losses, the
typical worker would need to realize a 24.5 percent return from training. My comparison of the effectiveness of ATAA and TAA in terms of decreasing earnings losses
reveals considerable variation across worker types, with nonunion, female, more
mature, and less educated workers receiving greater proportional benefits.
I proceed as follows. In section 2, I provide an overview of the TAA and ATAA
programs, their certification and eligibility requirements, and their available benefits. Section 3 discusses displacement-related earnings losses. Section 4 evaluates the
effectiveness of TAA and ATAA in reducing such losses, while section 5 discusses
the related implications and concludes.

2. Overview of TAA and ATAA
To establish eligibility for TAA benefits, a petition must first be filed with the
U.S. secretary of labor by either a group of three or more workers or an authorized
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representative. In reviewing the petition, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) must
investigate and determine within forty days whether trade has contributed to the job
loss. If so, DOL certifies that the firm and its workers can apply, as individuals, for
TAA benefits. There are two specific criteria for TAA certification.1 First, a significant number or proportion of the firm’s workers have been separated, either totally
or in part, from their jobs or are facing the threat of job separation. If DOL determines
that the first criterion has been met, then one or both of the following secondary
criteria must be satisfied: (1) there has been an absolute decrease in the firm’s output
and/or sales, coupled with increased imports of like goods that contributed importantly both to the workers’ separations or threat of separations and to the decline in
output and/or sales; and (2) production at the workers’ firm has shifted to a foreign
country, and (a) the country is a party to a free trade agreement with the United States,
(b) the country is a beneficiary under the Andean Trade Preferences Act, the African
Growth and Opportunity Act, or the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act or imports of like,
or (c) imports of goods directly competitive with those produced by the petitioning
workers’ firm have increased or are likely to increase.
TAA certification provides workers with access to several benefits. The 2002
amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 increased the trade readjustment allowance
from 52 to 78 weeks of UI; however, this extension is conditional on enrollment in
a TAA-funded training program or the acquisition of a training waiver. The 78 weeks
of UI, together with 26 weeks of “traditional” UI, provides 104 weeks of income
support. Workers participating in training that includes remedial education are eligible
for an additional 26 weeks of income support, providing a maximum of 130 weeks
of support. Workers receiving TAA certification may also be eligible for health care
assistance in the form of a tax credit. A onetime payment of $1,250 for job search
and relocation is also available.
To be considered for ATAA certification, the following criteria must be met. An
individual must be at least fifty years of age, have suffered a trade-related job loss
from a firm at which at least 5 percent of the remaining employees are at least fifty
years of age, have gained full-time employment within 26 weeks of displacement,
have been certified to receive TAA assistance, have an annual income of less than
$50,000, and be willing to forgo enrollment in TAA-funded training programs.
Additionally, the petitioning workers must possess skills that are not easily transferable and have been displaced from an industry facing adverse competitive conditions.2 As mentioned, such workers receive a subsidy of half the difference between
their predisplacement weekly earnings and their earnings at the new job. The subsidy
is paid for up to two years from the date of job displacement, subject to a maximum
payout of $10,000.
Although eligibility for ATAA benefits requires workers to first be deemed eligible
to receive TAA benefits, workers cannot receive benefits from more than one program.
While a displaced worker seeks employment to qualify for the ATAA program, if
regular TAA deadlines are met, the option to receive TAA benefits is preserved.
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However, once the worker selects ATAA and receives the first wage insurance supplement, he or she cannot switch to the TAA program. The initial receipt of an ATAA
payment represents the decision to choose ATAA and eliminates the option to accept
retraining, allowances, and TAA benefits. Similarly, enrolling in TAA-funded training
indicates forfeiture of any claim to ATAA subsidies. In other words, if a worker selects
TAA, ATAA eligibility is forfeited. Similarly, if ATAA is selected, TAA eligibility
with the exceptions of the relocation benefit and the health care tax credit is lost.

3. Displacement-Related Earnings Losses
Studies examining long-run displacement-related earnings losses have each used
regression analysis to compare the time paths of earnings for displaced workers to the
earnings of comparable nondisplaced workers. Although these studies have relied on
different data sources, they have produced a set of common conclusions. Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), using quarterly administrative data from Pennsylvania
span the years 1974 to 1986, reported predisplacement earnings losses three years prior
to the quarter in which job displacement occurs. Earnings were found to decrease
sharply with displacement; however, once reemployed, rapid earnings growth occurred.
Nevertheless, for the typical displaced worker, five years following displacement,
observed earnings remained 25 percent below the level that would be expected had
the worker not suffered the displacement. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan estimated
the discounted sum of real earnings losses from three years prior through six years
following displacement to be approximately $50,000.
Using PSID data for the years 1969 to 1980, Ruhm (1987) found that four years
following separation, 24.4 percent of men and 25.8 percent of women had earnings
losses greater than 25 percent, while 39.1 percent of men and 38.7 percent of women
had losses in excess of 10 percent. Examining PSID data over the years 1968 to
1988, Stevens (1997) found that long-run earnings remained 9 percent below expected
levels six or more years after separation; however, a large portion of the persistence
may have been due to subsequent job separations. For workers experiencing single
separations, earnings fell by 25 percent from three years prior to separation to the
year of separation. Six or more years after separation, earnings losses were only 1 percent. A major shortcoming of the PSID data, however, is that displacement is defined
as a worker losing or leaving a job because of a plant or business closing or being
either laid off or discharged from the position because of poor performance. Thus, the
PSID treats nearly all involuntary job loss, with the exception of temporary layoffs
or the ending of temporary jobs, as displacement.
Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) used NLSY79 data for the years 1979 to 1994 to quantify
wage and earnings losses of young adult displaced workers. NLSY79 respondents
separated from jobs because of layoffs or plant closings were classified as displaced.
Workers who left jobs voluntarily or for any other involuntary reason, who did not
change jobs, or who returned to the jobs from which they were separated were
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considered nondisplaced. Predisplacement losses were reported for male workers,
and in the three years immediately following displacement, both male and female
workers experienced significant losses. Five years after displacement, young male
workers lost approximately 9 percent and 21 percent in earnings and wages, respectively. Wage losses dissipated for female workers five years following displacement;
however, the earnings of female workers remained 12 percent below their expected
level. The authors reported that such displaced workers saw small reductions in earnings that, when coupled with large earnings growth experienced by nondisplaced
peers, led to an increased earnings gap.
All prior studies of this topic have reported evidence of pre- and postdisplacement
earnings losses and comparable time paths of losses. White (forthcoming) followed
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993); Ruhm (1987); Stevens (1997); and Kletzer
and Fairlie (2003) and used regression analysis to model earnings losses as the difference between the earnings of a worker who has or who will experience displacement and the earnings of a comparable nondisplaced worker. This technique results
in estimates of proportional differences in earnings attributable to job displacement
during each year prior to or since displacement. A sixteen-year window (five years
prior to the year in which displacement occurred through ten years following the
year of displacement) is used to determine the extent and time path of losses.3 I apply
the resulting proportional earnings differences to mean earnings values to estimate
the magnitudes and time paths of earnings losses for each worker type. As expected,
given the results of prior studies, for the typical worker, earnings losses begin three
years prior to displacement, increase in severity during the year of displacement, and
persist until the sixth year following displacement. Table 1 presents estimated real
annual earnings losses for the full sample and for each worker type. For the typical
displaced worker, predisplacement earnings losses are estimated to equal $9,912,
while postdisplacement losses sum to $24,153, indicating that a typical worker’s
total displacement-related earnings losses equal approximately $34,065.
Across worker types, considerable variation is reported in the durations and magnitudes of losses. Because of higher average earnings, estimated losses are greater
for union workers ($47,618) compared with nonunion workers ($32,439). The earlier onset and lengthier duration of losses combined with higher incomes contribute
to greater earnings losses for the typical male worker ($57,282) compared to his
female counterpart ($26,593). Workers at least thirty-five years of age lose, on average, $64,637 because of displacement, while workers twenty-five to thirty-four years
of age lose $39,542. This may be due to more mature workers’ being more likely to
possess firm- and/or industry-specific human capital. The loss of such human capital would correspond to greater earnings losses for more mature relative to younger
workers. The abbreviated time span of wage losses for the least and most educated
groups reduces estimates of earnings losses ($3,294 for those without high school
diplomas and $21,353 for college graduates). While earnings are positively correlated with education, college graduates are more likely to possess general skills that
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t–5

t–4

t–3

t–2

t–1

t

All workers
–1,255 –4,293 –1,829 –2,535 –2,235
Union
–9,266 –8,055 –7,601 –3,092
Nonunion
–1,363 –4,008 –1,433 –2,193 –2,113
Eighteen to
twenty-four
years of age
Twenty-five to
–5,086 –1,610 –2,900 –3,444
thirty-four
years of age
Thirty-five to
–5,450 –4,134 –8,356 –4,208 –5,680 –3,674
forty-four
years of age
Men
–2,909 –2,619 –3,912 –3,534 –2,257 –4,439
Women
–4,964
–2,646 –1,884
Less than a high
school diploma
High school diploma
–4,408 –1,866 –2,260 –2,486
Some college
–3,601
–8,066
–6,203 –1,949
Higher than a
–5,375
BA/BS degree

Sample

–7,809 –2,377 –2,579
–7,733
–4,590 –6,292
–4,808 –5,046

–4,418 –4,770
–7,792 –4,102
–6,124

–1,770

30,092
32,975
38,253

32,904
31,501
29,076

37,073

–9,809 –4,261 –4,205
–1,849 –2,270
–5,103
–2,262 –2,177

t + 9 t + 10

–6,831 –6,617
–3,449 –4,108
–3,294

t+8

–8,920 –2,925 –3,644 –2,332 –1,917

t+7

–6,859 –6,540

t+6

32,582

t+5

–7,693 –3,959 –3,623

t+4

–4,708 –6,520

t+3

32,255
34,900
32,061
24,706

t+2

Mean Real
Annual Earnings
of Nondisplaced
Workers ($)

–4,622 –5,074 –7,316 –2,113 –2,793
–4,795 –14,808
–4,703 –5,078 –6,810 –2,068 –2,671

t+1

Difference between Observed and Expected Real Annual Earnings in Sample Year ($)

Table 1
Estimated Displacement-Related Real Annual Earnings Losses,
Full Sample and Worker Subclassifications
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Figures 1 to 5
Real Annual Earnings Relative to Expected Levels
Figure 4: By Age Classification
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Figure 1: All Workers
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Figure 5: By Educational Attainment
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Figure 2: By Union Affiliation
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Figure 3: By Gender
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transfer across firms and industries. This may explain this cohort’s lower estimated
losses. A protracted duration of losses, coupled with greater proportional decreases
in wages, leads to higher estimated earnings losses for high school graduates
($32,972) and workers who have completed some college ($50,326).
Figures 1 through 5 illustrate the corresponding time paths of earnings losses
for displaced workers relative to comparable nondisplaced counterparts. The horizontal line represents the earnings of the typical nondisplaced worker. The line that
lies beneath the horizontal indicates the time path of earnings for a typical displaced
worker. Thus, the area bordered by the line depicting the time path of earnings
losses and the horizontal line represents earnings losses for the typical displaced
worker.
Having estimated earnings losses for each worker type, I now can calculate the
proportional reductions in losses that are expected to result from effective TAAfunded training or the worker’s receipt of wage insurance benefits.
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4. Evaluation of TAA and ATAA
To consider the effectiveness of TAA and ATAA, I apply expected wage insurance
(ATAA) subsidies and returns from TAA-funded worker training to the earnings
losses estimates presented in Table 1. As evaluation requires producing refined estimates of total earnings losses, I adjust estimated earnings loss values to allow for UI
payments received. UI compensation for the typical worker in each classification is
calculated as the probability that an unemployed worker files for and receives UI
payments times the percentage of the typical worker’s earnings that UI accounts for
(the wage replacement ratio [WRR]; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006b; O’Leary and
Rubin 1997; U.S. Department of Labor 2006a).4 The WRR is multiplied by the estimated ratio of the IUR to the TUR to derive the typical unemployed worker’s UI
receipts.5 This value is listed in column 4 of Table 2. Revised total losses are presented
in column 5.6
As mentioned at the outset, I relax ATAA program eligibility requirements to
derive the broadest possible set of reductions in earnings losses attributable to wage
insurance. As more mature workers tend to face greater earnings losses than their
younger counterparts, relaxing the eligibility requirements potentially produces conservative estimates of residual earnings losses and thus overstates the effectiveness
of the wage insurance program. Wage subsidies equal to half of year t + 1 and year
t + 2 earnings losses up to the maximum payout are listed in column 6.7 These values are subtracted from corresponding values in column 5, which presents earnings
loss estimates (column 3) less UI compensation received (column 4). Column 7 presents reductions in postdisplacement earnings losses due to UI and wage insurance,
while column 8 presents adjusted total earnings losses. Comparison of columns 8
and 5 permits derivation of the share reduction in losses, presented in column 9, due
to wage insurance. For the typical displaced worker, wage insurance reduces earnings losses by 14.4 percent. Figure 6 amends Figure 1 to illustrate this reduction in
earnings losses that is attributable to receipt of ATAA program benefits.
Corresponding results for all worker types are presented in column 9 of Table 2.
Less educated workers benefit to a greater degree than their more educated counterparts. For example, earnings losses of high school dropouts are halved by wage
insurance, while all other education classifications realize reductions between 10.5
and 15.3 percent. Nonunion workers realize a greater share reduction in losses than
union workers (15.3 percent compared to 5.1 percent), while female workers experience a slightly greater share reduction (14.4 percent) than male workers (11.9 percent). Finally, more mature workers benefit more from a wage subsidy than younger
workers.
We now turn to the influence of effective TAA-funded training on earnings losses.
Prior research into the effectiveness of public-funded training has frequently concluded that for the majority of workers, such programs are ineffective (Decker and
Corson 1995; Leigh 1991; LaLonde 1995). However, Jacobson, LaLonde, and
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–24,153
–22,695
–23,443
0

–29,946

–36,810

–42,051
–18,982
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341
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330
0
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391
541
370
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–49,985
–20,413

–56,505
–26,263
–3,294

–63,994

–38,939

–33,674
–47,077
–32,070
0

4,594
5,947
3,062

6,724
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6,699

5,614

4,848
2,398
4,891
0

–19,409
–26,169
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–17,351
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–57,295

–33,325
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–27,179
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14.12
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15.00

11.90
14.39
50.00

10.47

14.42

14.40
5.09
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Note: Year t indicates the year of displacement. UI = unemployment insurance; WI = wage insurance.,
a. Total displacement-related earnings loss is calculated as the sum of pre- and postdisplacement earnings losses less estimated UI received.
b. The hypothetical WI subsidy is derived as the sum of half the earnings lost in years t + 1 and t + 2. This implicitly assumes that all displacement-related earnings losses in year
t are due to joblessness. All other values presented are either sums over specified time periods of values presented in Table 1 or are derived directly from the values presented in
this table.
c. Total earnings loss is the sum of displacement-related earnings losses less UI received.

All workers
Union
Nonunion
Eighteen to
twenty-four
years of age
Twenty-five to
thirty-four
years of age
Thirty-five to
forty-four
years of age
Men
Women
Less than a high
school diploma
High school diploma
Some college
Higher than a
BA/BS degree

Sample

(3) Total
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7) Postdisplacement
(8) Total
(9) Reduction
(1)
(2)
DisplacementExpected
Total
Hypothetical
Earnings Loss
Earnings Loss in Total Loss
Predisplacement Postdisplacement Related Earnings UI Received Earnings WI Subsidy
Less UI and
with UI and
Due to WI
Losses ($)
Losses ($)
Loss ($)a
($)
Loss ($)
($)b
WI Subsidy ($)
WI Subsidy ($) Subsidy (%)c

Table 2
Summary of Estimated Earnings Losses and Estimated Effectiveness of Wage Insurance in Reducing Losses
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Figure 6
Earnings Losses with and without Alternative Trade
Adjustment Assistance (ATAA)
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Sullivan (1994) reported long-run benefits for workers completing relatively rigorous community college-level vocational and academic courses. Similarly, displaced
workers realize a 6 percent earnings increase from a year of community college
training (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1997). Returns vary across worker and
training types. For example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2005) reported that
male workers over the age of thirty-five years who completed a year of quantitative
vocational courses gained about 10 percent in earnings, while female workers tended
to realize greater gains. Workers completing other community college courses saw
gains of 3 to 5 percent.
To evaluate the effectiveness of TAA-funded training, I adopt a range of possible
returns to training: 3 percent, 6 percent, and 10 percent. I assume that all workers
complete one year of quantitative or technical training; that there is no depreciation,
throughout the period during which losses are realized, of any newly acquired skills
and knowledge; and that returns begin to be realized in the year immediately following displacement. This results in generous measures of the reduction in earnings
losses attributable to TAA-funded training and thus potentially overstates the effectiveness of such training.
Column 1 of Table 3 presents estimated total losses for the full sample and each
worker type. Columns 2 through 4 present estimated earnings losses assuming the
stated range of returns to training, and columns 5 through 7 indicate corresponding
proportional reductions in earnings losses. For the typical worker, training reduces
earnings losses by approximately 23.7 percent (assuming a 6 percent return); however,
the estimated range of reductions in losses is quite large. For example, use of the
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–36,890
–11,475

–34,720
–12,552
–716

–41,999

–25,901

–20,129
–42,598
–18,542
0

(4)
10 Percent
Return

Total Loss ($) with Training and

10.51
7.38
9.91

10.60
14.78
23.48

9.61

8.96

11.25
2.05
11.85
0.00

(5)
3 Percent
Return

22.36
15.45
24.43

22.58
30.82
46.96

20.22

19.47

23.67
5.25
24.85
0.00

(6)
6 Percent
Return

38.16
26.20
43.79

38.55
52.20
78.26

34.37

33.48

40.22
9.51
42.18
0.00

(7)
10 Percent
Return

Reduction in Total Loss (%) Due to

25.66
37.46
21.62

25.39
18.94
12.78

28.56

28.99

24.45
94.87
23.35
0.00

(8) Required
Return to
Eliminate
All Losses (%)

Note: Total earnings loss is the sum of displacement-related earnings losses less unemployment insurance received. Values presented in column 1 correspond
to values in column 5 of Table 2. Estimated losses, given various returns to training, are calculated as the sum of mean real annual earnings of nondisplaced
workers less estimated earnings losses for all years in which losses are reported (from Table 1) less the corresponding proportional increase in earnings, due
to training, for all years t + 1 and beyond. All estimated returns are annual.

All workers
Union
Nonunion
Eighteen to
twenty-four
years of age
Twenty-five to
thirty-four
years of age
Thirty-five to
forty-four
years of age
Men
Women
Less than a high
school diploma
High school diploma
Some college
Higher than a
BA/BS degree

Sample

(1)
Total
Earnings
Loss ($)

Table 3
Estimated Effectiveness of Trade Adjustment Assistance–Funded
Training in Reducing Earnings Losses
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Figure 7
Earnings Losses with and without Trade Adjustment
Assistance–Funded Training
0.05

Proportional Earnings Losses
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10 percent return reported by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1995) would have
reduced losses further (40.2 percent). To eliminate all displacement-related earnings
losses, a return to training equal to 24.5 percent would be necessary. Figure 7 illustrates
the time path of earnings losses, for the typical worker, without effective TAA-funded
training and with the assumed 3 percent, 6 percent, and 10 percent returns.
Across worker types, considerable variation can be seen in the ability of effective
training to reduce displacement-related earnings losses. This is due to variations in
the associated time paths of losses across worker types and the magnitudes of corresponding losses. For example, union workers are estimated to realize reductions in
losses equal to 2.1 percent to 9.5 percent because of training. High school dropouts,
however, are estimated to see 23.5 percent to 78.3 percent of losses ameliorated
because of effective training. Union workers are estimated to benefit (proportionally
speaking) the least; a training return of 94.9 percent would be necessary to eliminate
all earnings losses for these workers. For high school dropouts, the required return
to eliminate all associated losses is a much more reasonable 12.8 percent.

5. Conclusion
I have estimated the effectiveness of TAA-funded worker training and the receipt of
ATAA (i.e., wage insurance) benefits in terms of reducing displacement-related earnings losses. The resulting analysis suggests that both policies fall well short of fully
compensating displaced workers for monetary losses. In fact, neither program appears
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sufficiently effective to compensate workers for even half of their earnings losses. For
example, for the typical worker, ATAA benefits reduce earnings losses by 14.4 percent,
while completion of TAA-funded training (assuming a 6 percent return) reduces earnings losses by 23.7 percent. Additionally, across worker types, I find considerable variation with respect to corresponding reductions in earnings loss estimates: when
considering TAA-funded training, estimated reductions in earnings losses are seen
ranging from 5.3 percent for union workers to 47 percent for workers without high
school diplomas; somewhat similarly, ATAA-provided wage insurance decreases the
earnings losses of the typical union worker by an estimated 5.1 percent and decreases
the losses for high school dropouts by 50 percent. That these estimated reductions are,
admittedly, upper-bound values reinforces what some may consider the miserly level
of adjustment assistance provided to trade-displaced workers.
I mentioned at the outset that the TAA and ATAA programs serve the dual purposes of assisting displaced workers and reducing opposition to trade liberalization.
While my primary focus has been on how well stylized versions of each program
fare in alleviating displacement-related earnings losses, it is important to consider
such performance within a broader context. Considering the degree of opposition to
trade liberalization frequently reflected in public opinion polls, in conjunction with
the observed magnitudes and lengthy durations of displacement-related earnings
losses, suggests a need for an effective public policy response. In short, the more
effective programs are in reducing earnings losses, the more effective they may also
be in reducing public opposition to future trade liberalization.
Whether the levels of estimated reductions in losses that are presented here are
sufficiently large to deem the TAA and ATAA programs as successful is a subjective
determination; however, that support for trade liberalization has waned during the
more than four decades since the establishment of TAA may signal a perceived failure, among the public, of the policies that are purported to assist displaced workers.
I cannot determine this from my analysis; however, the measurements provided do
offer what I consider to be valuable information regarding the extent to which wage
insurance or effective TAA training reduces estimated displacement-related losses.
Moving forward, barring a substantial revision of U.S. trade policy, more expansive
and extensive trade liberalization is likely to occur. The willingness of policy makers
to devise effective programs that assist workers who are harmed by trade may be
determined in part by the ability of labor to influence policy makers. To that end, I hope
that the analysis provided here is both of interest and of value.

Notes
1. The current certification requirements combine the criterion of the traditional TAA program with
that of the North American Free Trade Agreement–Transitional Adjustment Assistance program. See
DeRocco (2003) for a detailed description of eligibility requirements.
2. The determination of whether job skills are not easily transferred to other employment is made
through DOL contact with a company official. To determine the industry’s competitive situation, information
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is collected from government and industry sources to determine if (1) the number of firms in the industry
is declining, (2) the conditions (such as declining production and/or employment) in the industry are such
that the affected workers are not likely to find new employment within the industry, or (3) aggregate U.S.
imports of products like or directly competitive with those produced in the industry are increasing.
3. For a complete discussion of the estimation methodology and NLSY79 data set, see White
(forthcoming).
4. The probability of filing for and receiving UI is .487. This is the monthly average insured unemployment rate (IUR) divided by the monthly average total unemployment rate (TUR) from 1979 to 2000.
An alternative measure is the ratio of ongoing UI claimants to the number of unemployed workers, the
average monthly value of which equals 0.426. The series are highly correlated (ρ = .96). The IUR/TUR
ratio produces upper-bound estimates of reductions in total earnings losses (Bassi and McMurrer 1997;
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006a; U.S. Department of Labor 2006b). The WRR value employed, 0.3595,
is the average for the years 1979 to 1995.
5. This assumes that each worker experiences at most one spell of unemployment per year.
6. Bassi and McMurrer (1997) reported that most workers at risk for involuntary unemployment who
are not covered by the UI system are at the low end of the wage spectrum. I assume uniform UI receipt
across the wage distribution, possibly overstating expected UI compensation for low-wage workers.
7. Because of data limitations, I exempt year t earnings losses from wage insurance subsidies. While
for individual worker observations, this may be a flawed assumption, in aggregate, the effects may be
minimal.
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